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HOLOCAUST DENIAL AND THE CONCEPT OF 
DIGNITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
JOHN C. KNECHTLE∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 On April 19, 2007, the Justice and Home Affairs Council of the 
European Union adopted the Framework Decision on Racism and 
Xenophobia (the “Framework Decision”),1 which seeks to initiate sub-
stantial hate speech regulation throughout the European Union, in-
cluding public speech which condones, denies, or grossly trivializes 
the crimes defined by the Nuremberg Tribunal, namely the Holo-
caust.2 Although the Framework Decision does not have direct effect 
in member states and the European Commission does not have powers 
to initiate enforcement actions, the Framework Decision asks Euro-
pean Union member states to enact legislation that criminalizes vari-
ous forms of pure speech based on their content alone.3  
 In my recent writing on this subject, I formulated a set of factored 
principles which address the issues of when and how governmental 
entities should regulate hate speech.4 The primary purpose of this Ar-
ticle is to examine the Framework Decision under the factored princi-
ples and (hopefully) shed some light on the question of whether the 
Framework Decision is an appropriate exercise of power for the Euro-
pean Union. After a careful analysis of the Framework Decision and 
the surrounding facts, I conclude that the Framework Decision is not 
a sound and appropriate measure for regulating hate speech for the 
following reasons: (1) the Framework Decision is an overly broad, one 
size fits all statute that fails to account for the historical realities of 
the various European Union member nations; and (2) the Framework 
Decision, although consistent with much European jurisprudence, is 
not likely to forward its putative purpose of protecting the dignity of 
the European populace. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 ∗  Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. The author thanks Adam Rowe 
for his research assistance, comments, and support. 
 1. Press Release, Council of the European Union, Framework Decision on Racism & 
Xenophobia (Apr. 19, 2007), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/ 
cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/misc/93739.pdf [hereinafter Framework Decision]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. John C. Knechtle, When to Regulate Hate Speech, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 539, 552 
(2006) (taking a comprehensive look at the issue of hate speech regulation through the 
lenses of U.S. constitutional jurisprudence and comparative constitutional law and, after a 
review of U.S. and international precedent, setting forth and briefly developing the ele-
ments of a factored approach to the regulation of hate speech). 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The debate on the issue of when and how to regulate hate speech 
is framed by two major philosophical camps: (1) those who favor the 
protection of the individual’s right to speak over the protection of 
group and/or individual dignity; and (2) those who feel that the fun-
damental right to free speech must be curtailed with respect to hate 
speech in order to protect the group and the individual dignity of tra-
ditionally disadvantaged minority groups.5 
 There are certain enigmatic issues that bubble up to the surface 
time and again throughout this debate. How is a nation to arrive at a 
definition of “hate speech” that protects the dignity of the marginal-
ized group while still ensuring that legitimate political, philosophi-
cal, academic, and scientific debate is not suppressed? Is human dig-
nity capable of state regulation so that the state can increase or de-
crease human dignity? Or does human dignity emanate from a 
source beyond the reach of the law and what hate speech regulation 
really seeks is a more respectful and civilized discourse? What crite-
ria does the government use in deciding which groups shall receive 
the protection of the hate speech regulation? For example, if race, 
ethnicity, or religion are criteria, does the hate speech regulation 
protect all races, ethnicities, and religions, or only those which can 
prove a certain type, amount, breadth, and duration of recent dis-
crimination? Is there a principled and objective basis for the regula-
tion of speech that expresses and incites hatred, or is the basis 
pragmatic and relative to the cultural and social history of the nation 
                                                                                                                     
 5. See id. at 539-43. The United States is the foremost proponent of the prospeech 
camp, and the nations of Europe hold a corresponding position in the prodignity camp. See 
id. 
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which is attempting such regulation? Is there any evidence that the 
various attempts at hate speech regulation have actually achieved 
the putative goal of reducing the prevalence of racial, religious, eth-
nic, or gender-based hatred in society?  
 These questions are fundamental, and their answers determine 
the appropriate remedy in the current hate speech debate. This Arti-
cle takes the position that content-based hate speech regulation may 
be justified only when both of the following factors are met: (1) it is 
enacted by a society that has a recent history of racial, religious, or 
ethnic strife that is sufficiently severe to justify the curtailment of its 
citizens’ fundamental right to free speech in order to address the his-
torical wrong; and (2) the jurisprudential history of the state, or 
states if it is an international treaty, is amenable to content-based 
speech restrictions within its understanding of freedom of expres-
sion.6 An increasingly popular jurisprudential justification for hate 
speech regulation is the protection of human dignity. Human dignity 
in this context is often understood as a quality which the state can 
regulate. I will argue that human dignity comes from within—well 
beyond the reach of the law—and, although we can be offended and 
wounded by words, other than the legal remedies for defamation, the 
state best recognizes human dignity in the context of speech by re-
specting the individual’s right to speak and by supporting nonlegal 
avenues to encourage respect and tolerance in society. 
II.   THE HOLOCAUST 
 The Framework Decision directly references the crimes of geno-
cide committed against the Jews during World War II and mandates 
that speech acts that deny, minimize, or trivialize the Holocaust be 
criminalized and punished.7 Because the criminality of Holocaust de-
nial is addressed by the Framework Decision, this Article focuses on 
the Holocaust and the Holocaust denial movement in its analyses of 
the propriety of the speech regulation mandated therein. 
 The Nazi regime in Germany carried out the genocidal murder of 
more than six million Jews.8 This is one of the most infamous crimes 
of the twentieth century, and it has had a profound influence on the 
development of human dignity and international human rights law.9 
                                                                                                                     
 6. See id. at 552.  
 7. Framework Decision, supra note 1, at 1-2. Specifically, the Framework Decision 
mandates that European Union Member Nations criminalize speech that publicly con-
dones, denies, or grossly trivializes the crimes defined by the Nuremberg Tribunal. Id.      
at 1-2. 
 8. Holocaust Memorial Museum, Holocaust Encyclopedia, http://www.ushmm.org/ 
wlc/article.php?lang=en&ModuleId=10005143 (last visited Nov. 12, 2008).  
 9. The Preamble of the United Nations Charter expresses belief in “the dignity and 
worth of the human person.” U.N. Charter pmbl.; see, e.g., American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Official Rec., OAS/Ser.L/V/I.4 rev.12 (1992) (adopted by 
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It can be reasonably argued that the development of the concept of 
human rights law in the modern sense is a direct response to the 
atrocities of Nazi Germany.10 The magnitude of this carnage is so 
great that the human imagination struggles to even comprehend it, 
much less make sense of it. Many of the major perpetrators of the 
Holocaust were tried and punished by the Nuremberg Tribunal.11 
However, the conviction of many of the Nazi perpetrators at Nurem-
berg is merely the end of the first part, and the beginning of the sec-
ond part, of the history of the Holocaust. 
 The seeds of the Holocaust denial movement were planted by the 
Nazis even before the fall of Berlin and the destruction of the concen-
tration camps at the end of World War II. As Professor Lasson points 
out: 
Inmates at concentration camps testified that they were frequently 
taunted by their captors: “And even if some proof should remain 
and some of you survive, people will say that the events you de-
scribe are too monstrous to be believed; they will say that they are 
the exaggerations of Allied propaganda and will believe us, who 
will deny everything, and not you.”12 
This quote rings prophetically true, as the Holocaust denial move-
ment has consistently exploited the incomprehensible scope and 
magnitude of the crime to argue that the generally accepted account 
of the Holocaust is a lie.13  
 There are two general rhetorical trends in the Holocaust denial 
movement: (1) the Negationists who claim that the Holocaust never 
                                                                                                                     
the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948)) (beginning with: “The 
American peoples have acknowledged the dignity of the individual”; followed by Preamble, 
beginning with: “All men are born free and equal, in dignity and in rights”), available at 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic2.American%20Declaration.htm (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2008); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 5, June 27, 1981, OAU 
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (entered into force Oct. 21, 
1986) (“Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a 
human being . . . .”); see also Oscar Schachter, Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 
AM. J. INT’L L. 848, 853 (1983). 
 10. See Christopher D. Van Blarcum, Internet Hate Speech: The European Framework 
and the Emerging American Haven, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 781, 785 (2005) (indicating 
that “[a]fter the Holocaust, European countries moved to take steps to prevent similar 
atrocities from ever happening again, and hate speech was targeted for elimination”). 
 11. Richard Goldstone, The United Nations’ War Crimes Tribunals: An Assessment, 12 
CONN. J. INT’L L. 227, 229 (1997). 
 12. Kenneth Lasson, Holocaust Denial and the First Amendment: The Quest for Truth 
in a Free Society, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 35, 37 (1997) (quoting PRIMO LEVI, THE DROWNED 
AND THE SAVED 11-12 (Raymond Rosenthal trans., Vintage Int’l 1989)). 
 13. See, e.g., ARTHUR R. BUTZ, THE HOAX OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE CASE 
AGAINST THE PRESUMED EXTERMINATION OF EUROPEAN JEWRY (3d ed. 2003), available at 
http://vho.org/dl/ENG/Hoax.pdf; PAUL RASSINIER, DEBUNKING THE GENOCIDE MYTH (Noon-
tide Press 1978), available at http://www.vho.org/aaargh/fran/livres/debunk.pdf.  
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occurred;14 and (2) the Revisionists who admit that something like 
the historical Holocaust occurred but make revisionist arguments 
about the scope of the crime, challenging things such as the official 
number of Jews murdered and whether gas chambers were used to 
carry out mass murder.15 Many of the Revisionists claim that their 
goal is different from the Negationists and the anti-Semites, in that 
the Revisionists claim that they are simply searching for historical 
truth rather than seeking to intimidate the Jewish people.16 The text 
of the Framework Decision seems clear in its mandate to criminalize 
and punish either of these trends within the Holocaust                    
denial movement.17 
 The development of the Internet as a forum for speech and debate 
has had a profound effect on the Holocaust denial movement, just as 
the Internet provided the Holocaust denial movement with an inter-
national platform from which to espouse their message of hate.18 
Where an individual Holocaust denier was once limited to printing 
and distributing racist tracts in a single geographic location, now 
that same individual could broadcast a message of hatred across 
oceans and continents with the click of a mouse. The explosion of on-
line anti-Semitic organizations has influenced many nations in Eu-
rope and elsewhere to enact strict legislation that criminalizes both 
hate speech in general and Holocaust denial in particular.19 
III.   THE HATE SPEECH DEBATE IN AMERICA 
 The early history of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
is unique in that the preference and protections that it espoused re-
garding free speech were largely either ignored or construed in a 
manner that robbed the amendment of any de facto significance.20 
Like so many other provisions of the Bill of Rights in the U.S. Consti-
tution, the First Amendment existed as a piece of elegant rhetoric 
that had little backing from the power structures within the U.S. 
government throughout most of the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
                                                                                                                     
 14. Emanuela Fronza, The Punishment of Negationism: The Difficult Dialogue Be-
tween Law and Memory, 30 VT. L. REV. 609, 613-14 (2006).  
 15. Yulia A. Timofeeva, Hate Speech Online: Restricted or Protected? Comparison of 
Regulations in the United States and Germany, 12 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 253, 
258-59 (2003). 
 16. Id. at 259. 
 17. The Framework Decision seemingly makes specific reference to the Holocaust 
when it mandates the criminalization of “[p]ublicly condoning, denying or grossly trivialis-
ing . . . crimes defined by the Tribunal of Nüremberg.” See Framework Decision, supra note 
1, at 1-2. 
 18. Timofeeva, supra note 15, at 256-58. 
 19. Id. at 260; Knechtle, supra note 4, at 540-54. 
 20. SAMUEL WALKER, HATE SPEECH: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN CONTROVERSY   
12 (1994). 
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turies.21 Indeed, within two years of the enactment of the First 
Amendment, Congress (with many of the constitutional drafters par-
ticipating) passed the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, which crimi-
nalized speech that criticized any branch of the U.S. government.22  
 The early decades of the twentieth century brought new chal-
lenges and a new generation of jurists who began the gradual and 
sometime tenuous process of elevating the First Amendment from its 
status as a beautiful but vapid relic from the eighteenth century to 
the position it currently holds as the emblem of one of the most re-
vered and cherished values of American society.23 The twentieth cen-
tury resurrection of the First Amendment in the United States car-
ried with it a new set of issues that had to be addressed. The most 
fundamental issue was the question of what categories of speech are 
protected by the First Amendment and what categories of speech fall 
outside of its protections.24 Despite the presence of powerful dissent-
ers to the contrary, the federal judiciary never adopted an absolutist 
approach to First Amendment jurisprudence.25 The U.S. courts have 
recognized almost from the beginning that some forms of speech are 
harmful to society and the government has a legitimate right to regu-
late speech of this nature even though it involves a content-based re-
striction.26 The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently 
held that obscenity,27 defamation,28 fighting words,29 incitement or 
conspiracy to imminent violence,30 and true threats31 are all forms of 
speech that are not protected by the First Amendment.  
 Hate speech is a category of speech that brushes up against sev-
eral of the speech categories that U.S. jurisprudence does not tradi-
tionally protect.32 Hate speech can take the form of fighting words, 
defamation and incitement, or actual imminent violence.33 However, 
hate speech also transcends those traditional categories of nonpro-
                                                                                                                     
 21. See id. 
 22. An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States (Sedition 
Act), ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798). 
 23. WALKER, supra note 20, at 18-37. 
 24. See infra notes 27-31. 
 25. Knechtle, supra note 4, at 564.  
 26. Id. 
 27. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 
U.S. 49, 69 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).  
 28. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985); 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 283 (1964). 
 29. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942). 
 30. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982); Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969). 
 31. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 
705, 708 (1969). 
 32. See Knechtle, supra note 4, at 564-71, 569-73.  
 33. Id. at 564-65. 
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tected speech in a manner that justifies a serious debate about 
whether it could, or should, be identified as its own separate category 
of nonprotected speech here in the United States. The debate in the 
United States is ongoing, but thus far those who argue that the tra-
ditional categories are sufficient to protect the government interest 
in regulating hate speech seem to be winning.34 The U.S. approach to 
the hate speech issue can be generally characterized as prospeech, as 
opposed to the prodignity approach preferred in many                 
European states.35 
IV.   THE EUROPEAN APPROACH TO HATE SPEECH REGULATION 
 The nations of Europe and the European Union generally have 
never viewed the concept of freedom of speech in the same manner as 
the United States. While practically every European nation recog-
nizes a fundamental right to freedom of speech, the member nations 
of the European Union have generally been more open to allowing 
content-based speech regulation in circumstances where the regu-
lated content is hate.36 Legislation that seeks to regulate and crimi-
nalize hate speech and Holocaust denial is abundant on both the na-
tional and international level throughout Europe.37  
A.   European Hate Speech Regulation on the International Level 
 The earliest and arguably most important international treaty 
that expressly addresses the issue of content-based hate speech regu-
lation is the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).38 The ICERD was adopted 
by the General Assembly for signature in 1965, actually entered into 
force in 1969, and has as its goal the total elimination of racism and 
discrimination.39 Article 4 of the ICERD specifically addresses hate 
speech and reaffirms that all signatories shall (1) criminalize the 
“dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred”; (2) 
“declare illegal and prohibit organizations . . . which promote and in-
cite racial discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such 
organizations or activities as an offense punishable by law”; and (3) 
prohibit “public authorities . . . [from] promot[ing] or incit[ing]        
racial discrimination.”40  
                                                                                                                     
 34. See WALKER, supra note 20, at 159-67.  
 35. Knechtle, supra note 4, at 559-65. 
 36. Van Blarcum, supra note 10, at 786. 
 37. See id. 
 38. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion (ICERD), opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 352, available 
at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/d_icerd.htm. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. art. 4.  
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 More than 150 nations have signed and ratified the ICERD.41 The 
United States has ratified the ICERD but has filed a reservation in-
dicating that it will not take any measures that violate the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.42 Within the context of the de-
bate between the prospeech and the prodignity camps on the hate 
speech regulation issue, the ICERD represents a substantial victory 
for those who argue that the dignity of the individual or group must 
take precedence over the speaking rights of racists.43 The influence of 
the ICERD on the development of antihate speech legislation in Eu-
rope is profound, and since the inception of the ICERD, every Euro-
pean nation has adopted legislation that prohibits and criminalizes 
racist and hateful speech.44 
 Another major player in the area of European hate speech regula-
tion is the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe is a treaty-
making body that was first established in 1949 to promote intergov-
ernmental cooperation throughout Europe and develop international 
standards aimed at preventing the reoccurrence of gross human 
rights violations such as those which occurred in Europe during 
World War II.45 With forty-seven member nations throughout Eu-
rope, the Council of Europe is highly influential in the area of        
human rights.46 
 In 2002, the Committee Members of the Council of Europe 
adopted the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, 
Concerning the Criminalization of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic 
Nature Committed Through Computer Systems (the “Additional Pro-
tocol”).47 The Additional Protocol delineates five types of speech con-
duct that signatories are required to criminalize: (1) each party must 
criminalize “distributing, or otherwise making available, racist and 
xenophobic materials to the public through a computer system”; (2) 
each party must “criminalize the act of directing a threat to a person 
through the Internet purely because of race, national origin, or relig-
ion”; (3) each party must “criminalize the act of publicly insulting a 
person through a computer system because of the person’s race, na-
tional origin, or religion”; (4) each party must criminalize distribut-
ing over the internet “material which denies, grossly minimi[z]es, 
approves, or justifies acts constituting genocide or crimes against 
                                                                                                                     
 41. Van Blarcum, supra note 10, at 786. 
 42. Id.  
 43. See id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 787-88. 
 46. See Council of Europe, http://www.coe.int (last visited Nov. 12, 2008). 
 47. Van Blarcum, supra note 10, at 791. 
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humanity”; and (5) each party must criminalize “aiding or abetting 
the commission of any of the offenses established by the Protocol.”48 
 The Additional Protocol was opened for signatories on January 28, 
2003, and as of January 10, 2004, has been signed by twenty-three 
members of the Council of Europe.49 The overwhelming European ac-
ceptance of the Additional Protocol again demonstrates that Europe-
ans generally favor content-based speech regulation in the area of 
racist and hateful speech. It also demonstrates the Internet’s power-
ful role as a forum for international dissemination of racist and      
xenophobic ideas. 
 The ICERD and the Additional Protocol are very much aligned 
with the Framework Decision in both spirit and philosophy. They 
employ the same means, prohibit the same acts, and are generally 
applicable to the same situations. On the international level, the ap-
proach to hate speech regulation throughout Europe is quite consis-
tent.50 Article 4 of the ICERD provides that signatory states shall (1) 
criminalize the dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or 
hatred, (2) prohibit organizations that promote and incite racial dis-
crimination and criminalize participation in such organizations, and 
(3) prohibit public authorities and public institutions from promoting 
or inciting racial discrimination.51 This approach to the problem of 
hate speech has led to several recent high-profile prosecutions in the 
area of Holocaust denial at the state level.52 
B.   European Hate Speech Regulation on the State Level 
 Following the mandate of the ICERD and numerous other inter-
national treaties on the subject of racial discrimination, the nations 
of Europe have almost uniformly adopted measures that criminalize 
hate speech on the national level. Germany, with its unique history 
of horrific racial violence, has adopted some of the most restrictive 
speech regulations on the continent.53 The reconstruction process 
that was carried out in Germany after World War II included the en-
actment of many German statutes aimed at eliminating Nazism and 
its ideology of racial hatred altogether.54 The current German law is 
                                                                                                                     
 48. Id. at 792-94 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 49. Id. at 791. 
 50. See DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, FREE SPEECH AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY              
161-80 (1999). 
 51. See Van Blarcum, supra note 10, at 786. 
 52. In addition to the Faurisson and Toben prosecutions that are cited and discussed, 
see infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text, the reader may wish to explore the Holocaust 
denial cases of Ernest Zundel, David Irving, and Roger Garady. Lasson, supra note 12, at 
41-45; see also Pascale Bloch, Response to Professor Fronza’s The Punishment of Negation-
ism, 30 VT. L. REV. 627, 635-36 (2006). 
 53. Timofeeva, supra note 15, at 260. 
 54. Id. 
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clear that certain forms of racist political discourse will not be toler-
ated in the least, and the German State has demonstrated a willing-
ness to prosecute those who would cross the line.  
 Article 5 of the Basic Law of Germany provides that every indi-
vidual member of society has the right to freedom of expression,55 but 
then announces that “[t]hese rights shall find their limits in the pro-
visions of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young per-
sons, and in the right to personal honor.”56 The practical effect of this 
language in the German law is that the State has plenary power to 
regulate speech that it determines tends to stir up racial strife. Other 
passages in the Basic Law lend further support to the German 
State’s power to regulate hate speech based on content. Article 1 de-
clares human dignity to be of the utmost value,57 and article 18 pro-
vides for the forfeiture of basic rights when such rights are abused.58 
 The German penal code contains several provisions that criminal-
ize hate speech in general and Holocaust denial in particular,59 and 
the German State has carried out several recent high-profile prose-
cutions of prominent Holocaust deniers.60 The far-reaching extent to 
which the German State is willing to prosecute and punish Holocaust 
deniers for speech crimes is exemplified by the recent Toben deci-
sion.61 Fredrick Toben is an Australian Holocaust revisionist who 
published his revisionist material on Web pages that originated in 
computers outside the geographical borders of Germany.62 In uphold-
ing Mr. Toben’s ten-month prison sentence, the German Federal 
Court set the precedent that all material published on the Internet, 
no matter its country of origin, is subject to German legislation pro-
hibiting hate speech.63 
                                                                                                                     
 55. Article 5 provides that  
[e]very person shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opin-
ions in speech, writing, and pictures and to inform himself without hindrance 
from generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of report-
ing by means of broadcasts and films shall be guaranteed. There shall be no 
censorship.  
Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Basic Law] May 23, 1949, BGBl. I, 
as amended through Dec. 20, 1993, art. 5, § 2, translated in Basic Law for the Federal Re-
public of Germany (Grundgesetz, GG), http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2008). 
 56. Id. art. 5, § 2.  
 57. See id. art. 1.  
 58. Id. art. 18. 
 59. Timofeeva, supra note 15, at 261-62. 
 60. See id. at 262-64. 
 61. See Van Blarcum, supra note 10, at 803-04. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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 The Faurisson case is an example of the European approach to 
hate speech regulation on both the state and international level.64 In 
Faurisson, the United Nations Human Rights Committee upheld the 
French conviction of Robert Faurisson who was convicted of violating 
French law that prohibits any questioning of the findings of the Nur-
emberg Tribunal.65 Mr. Faurisson, a member of the revisionist strain 
of the Holocaust denial movement, was convicted for repeatedly de-
nying that the Jews killed at Auschwitz were killed through the use 
of gas chambers.66 The Human Rights Committee, acting under arti-
cle 5, paragraph 4 of the Optional Protocol to the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, found that Faurisson’s content-
based speech conviction under French law did not violate article 19, 
paragraph 3 of the Covenant, which guarantees free speech           
and expression.67 
 Although in theory a right to human dignity need not restrict the 
right to freedom of expression, in practice this has been the result in 
European and international law.68 The speech-restrictive effect of a 
constitutional or international human right to human dignity can be 
explained by a few factors. First, the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution was written and understood as a negative right, 
whereas many other Western democracies understand freedom of ex-
pression as a positive right bestowed by the government and there-
fore regulated by the state when private actors cause harm.69 Second, 
the American emphasis is on the rights of the speaker and any harm 
to the listener is viewed in terms of interests, not rights, whereas 
other Western Democracies view harm to the listener as violating a 
right—the right to human dignity—which results in a balancing of 
these competing rights by courts.70 Third, the American philosophy is 
more libertarian and individualistic, creating tests like the content-
neutrality doctrine, while other Western Democracies hold a more 
communitarian philosophy which includes fraternity, solidarity,   
and paternalism.71  
 The foregoing analysis of the European approach to the problem of 
hate speech is illustrative of two points that will be important to the 
next Section of this discussion: (1) European jurisprudence from the 
                                                                                                                     
 64. Faurisson v. France, U.N. Human Rights Comm., U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993 (Dec. 16, 1996).  
 65. Id. ¶ 10. 
 66. Id. ¶ 2.6. 
 67. Id. ¶ 9.6.  
 68. See Knechtle, supra note 4, at 541-43. 
 69. Guy E. Carmi, Dignity–The Enemy from Within: A Theoretical and Comparative 
Analysis of Human Dignity as a Free Speech Justification, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 957, 995-
96 (2007). 
 70. Id. at 993. 
 71. Id. at 990. 
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end of World War II to the present favors the concept of protection of 
individual and group dignity over the concept of protection of free 
speech; and (2) the leading nations of Europe are willing to use the 
police power of the state and international authorities to prevent 
speech that might encourage the reoccurrence of the kind of atroci-
ties that were committed on the continent during World War II. The 
Framework Decision is the latest in a long line of similarly inten-
tioned statutes and treaties that seek to punish speech acts that the 
current European power structure regards as harmful and/or dan-
gerous.72 The unique aspect of the Framework Decision is that, in at-
tempting to regulate hate speech in the international law context, it 
makes express reference to the Nuremberg Decision and thus seems 
to directly reference the Holocaust.73 
V.   TOWARDS A FACTORED APPROACH 
 As mentioned in the introduction, I have advocated for two factors 
in approaching the questions of whether, when, and how a state or 
international body should address the problem of hate speech with 
legislation.74 First, a legislative body should look to the “historical ac-
counts of ethnic, racial and religious violence, genocide, and dis-
criminatory practices” that have occurred within the jurisdiction of 
the state or region in which the body operates, and determine 
whether the historical record demonstrates a need for regulation of 
this kind.75 Pursuant to this first factor, any law that punishes 
speech based on its content alone must at a minimum address a his-
torical wrong within the subject society that is pervasive and severe 
to the extent that speech regulation is arguably justified.76 The “his-
torical wrong” aspect of this first factor means that, for example, 
while a law specifically criminalizing Holocaust denial may be ap-
propriate for Germany because it addresses a significant historical 
wrong committed by the German State, the same law would be inap-
propriate in Indonesia because the historical wrong that the law ad-
dresses (i.e., the Holocaust) was not committed by Indonesia or a fac-
tion within Indonesian society.77 Conversely, a law criminalizing the 
denial of the atrocities committed by Indonesia in its occupation of 
East Timor78 may be appropriate for Indonesia and/or East Timor, 
                                                                                                                     
 72. See Timofeeva, supra note 15, at 260-68. 
 73. Framework Decision, supra note 1, at 2. 
 74. Knechtle, supra note 4, at 552. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See id. at 552-53. 
 77. Id. at 553-58. 
 78. Julie M. Sforza, Note, The Timor Gap Dispute: The Validity of the Timor Gap 
Treaty, Self-Determination, and Decolonization, 22 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 481, 481-
82 (1999). 
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but not Germany. The reasoning here is that the power to regulate 
speech based on its content carries within it a malignancy too dan-
gerous to allow a legislative body to look beyond the walls of its own 
society when determining which crimes are so monstrous that speech 
content regulation is warranted. 
 The “pervasive and severe” aspect of the analysis under the first 
factor simply means that individual crimes (monstrous though they 
may be) that have no substantive impact on society as a whole or a 
significant group within the society are not an appropriate basis for 
content-based speech regulation. Content-based speech regulation is 
only appropriate when it responds to crimes against humanity, mass 
murder, and/or genocide. Thus, a law criminalizing the denial of the 
Holocaust may be appropriate under this analysis because the Holo-
caust was an act of mass murder that had a wide impact in Germany 
and much of Europe. 
 The second factor that must be addressed by any legislative body 
seeking to promulgate content-based speech regulation is the juris-
prudential history of the society within which speech is to be regu-
lated.79 Prohibitions of Holocaust denial can be grounded in such ju-
risprudential concerns as equality, group libel, peace and security, 
and human dignity. Protection of Holocaust denial can be grounded 
in such jurisprudential concerns as disapproval of content-based 
speech restrictions absent a compelling governmental interest, which 
is an interest absent here. Where the historical jurisprudence of a so-
ciety falls on this continuum of opinion is absolutely relevant to the 
questions of speech regulation and must be taken into account by any 
body legislating in this area. 
 The United States is easily identified as the vocal leader of the 
prospeech camp in the international hate speech debate, a role that 
has garnered the label “American Exceptualism.”80 Any legislative 
body considering the problem of hate speech regulation within the 
United States would have to deal in particular with the past fifty 
years of jurisprudential preference for individual speaking rights in 
                                                                                                                     
For the last twenty-five years a quiet battle has raged in East Timor which has 
killed thousands and produced enough political “disappearances” to rival even 
the worst period of political disappearances in El Salvador in the late 1980s. 
Indonesian police forces have regularly detained and tortured innocent civil-
ians and suppressed peaceful protests by systematically gunning down hun-
dreds of young people, leading to one of the worst genocides in post-World War 
II history. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also NOAM CHOMSKY, ROGUE STATES: THE RULE OF FORCE IN 
WORLD AFFAIRS 51-61 (2000) (discussing the horrific realities of Indonesian occupation of 
East Timor).  
 79. Knechtle, supra note 4, at 552. 
 80. See Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN 
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29, 30 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005). 
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this country and the Supreme Court’s expanding case law which pro-
hibits content-based speech regulation in the area of hate speech.81 
Thus, pursuant to the second factor (“jurisprudential history”), other 
than hate speech that incites imminent violence or threatens unlaw-
ful acts, hate speech regulation based on its offensive content is in-
appropriate (not to mention unconstitutional) in the United States. 
 The same cannot be said for Germany. The German Basic Law 
expressly recognizes the importance of individual and group dignity 
and further acknowledges the State’s right to use its police power to 
protect human dignity.82 German law since the end of World War II 
has consistently sought to eliminate Nazi ideology and the ra-
cial/religious prejudice which spawned the Holocaust.83 Thus, under 
the second “jurisprudential history” factor, it would appear that con-
tent-based speech regulation would be appropriate within Germany. 
 The factored approach to the question of hate speech regulation 
leads to the observation that the fundamental right to free speech is 
not absolute. At a minimum, every state has a legitimate interest in 
preventing hate speech that constitutes a true threat of violence to 
an individual or group.84 This kind of speech regulation should be 
constitutionally permissible even in the United States.85 There may 
be certain societies within which it is appropriate for the sovereign to 
move beyond the criminalization of true threats of racial violence to-
ward more pervasive content-based speech regulation, and in those 
societies the factored approach discussed herein may be of help to    
the legislators. 
VI.   THE FRAMEWORK DECISION 
 The following Section of this Article examines the Framework De-
cision under the factored approach, giving special attention to the 
question of human dignity and the role that dignity plays in the ju-
risprudence of both the prospeech approach to the question of hate 
speech regulation and the prodignity approach to the question. 
                                                                                                                     
 81. See generally R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding that the City 
of St. Paul’s Bias Motivated Crime Ordinance is unconstitutional under the First Amend-
ment). The Court noted that content-based and viewpoint-based restrictions on speech are 
generally invalid and have only been upheld “in a few limited areas, which are ‘of such 
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.’ ” Id. at 382-83 (quoting 
Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).  
 82. Timofeeva, supra note 15, at 260-64. 
 83. See id. at 260-61. 
 84. Knechtle, supra note 4, at 543. 
 85. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969); Bridges v. California, 314 
U.S. 252, 260-63 (1941). 
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A.   The Framework Decision and the Historical Accounts of Ethnic, 
Racial, and Religious Violence Within the European Union 
 The Framework Decision makes specific reference to the Holo-
caust when it mandates the criminalization of “[p]ublicly condoning, 
denying or grossly trivialising . . . crimes defined by the Tribunal of 
Nüremberg.”86 The Framework Decision also broadly criminalizes 
speech acts of any kind that publicly incite violence or hatred on the 
basis of “race, colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin.”87 
 The Framework Decision is problematic with regard to the issue 
of the historical accounts of ethnic, racial, and religious violence 
within the various member nations of the European Union. With its 
reference to the Holocaust and the Holocaust denial movement, the 
Framework Decision asks all European Union member nations to 
criminalize speech that addresses a historical wrong committed by 
only one of its members, Germany. Indeed, most European Union 
member nations can be generally classified as either being victims of 
Nazi Germany (e.g., Poland),88 having actively fought against the 
Nazis (e.g., United Kingdom),89 or simply not existing during the time 
of the Holocaust (e.g., Czech and Slovak Republics).90 
 The Framework Decision paints with a brush too broad and fails 
to take a proper account of the history of racial strife within the Eu-
ropean Union. There are societies within which content-based speech 
regulation may be necessary to address a legitimate historical wrong. 
However, one must question the propriety of the Framework Deci-
sion because it takes an atrocious act of genocide committed by one of 
its member nations as a mandate that the entire European Union 
                                                                                                                     
 86. Framework Decision, supra note 1, at 1-2. 
 87. Id. at 1. 
 88. Germany attacked Poland on September 1, 1939. Matthew Lippman, The History, 
Development, and Decline of Crimes Against Peace, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 957, 995-
96 (2004) (“The Nuremberg Tribunal concluded that the Reich’s attack on Poland was 
‘most plainly an aggressive war, which was to develop in due course into a war which em-
braced almost the whole world, and resulted in the commission of countless crimes, both 
against the laws and customs of war, and against humanity.’ ” (quoting United States v. 
Hermann Göring, in 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 411, 445-46 (1948))). 
 89.  Matthew Lippman, Aerial Attacks on Civilians and the Humanitarian Law of 
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 90. At midnight on December 31, 1992, the Czech-Slovak State expired and split into 
two wholly new and independent successor states, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Re-
public. Eric Stein, Peaceful Separation: “A New Virus”?, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 25,  
25 (1997). 
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criminalize speech acts that even so much as “trivialize” that act      
of genocide. 
 Laws like the Framework Decision are properly suited and more 
effective when enacted on the national (rather than international or 
regional) level. The State of Germany is in a better position to con-
strue a law like the Framework Decision in a manner that truly 
promotes justice and dignity because it is more closely connected to 
the historical wrong that the law addresses. Thus, the State of Ger-
many is more likely to make a better decision about when and how to 
apply such a law. 
 To argue that the Holocaust occurred within the European society 
as a whole and therefore that all of Europe must criminalize the de-
nial or trivialization of the Holocaust still does not address why 
members of the European Union and the Council of Europe, which 
are arguably well beyond the confines of European society, are sub-
ject to this prohibition. Questions are also raised: Why limit speech 
prohibitions of genocide to the one that occurred in Nazi Germany? 
Why isn’t the much more recent genocide in the former Yugoslavia 
included in the European Union directive? Why isn’t the Armenian 
genocide included? If Europe is part of the world community, why 
isn’t each genocide of the modern era included in the prohibition? 
 Criminalizing the act of “grossly trivializing” the Holocaust raises 
the question of what speech constitutes “grossly trivializing.” If his-
torical research reveals that the previously established number of 
victims killed in a particular concentration camp is inaccurate, can 
the historian who reveals this new information be prosecuted under 
a statute adopted pursuant to the Framework Decision? The Frame-
work Decision, like most hate speech statutes, does not allow truth to 
be a defense. If such a prosecution is a possibility, wouldn’t this end 
or at least chill such research and thereby undermine a primary jus-
tification for freedom of expression—the discovery of truth?91 
 Neither the dignity of the individual nor the dignity of the group 
is protected when laws like the Framework Decision are written and 
enforced without reference to a country’s historical accounts of eth-
nic, racial, and religious violence. Without a firm historical basis for 
content-based speech regulation, these kinds of laws serve only to (1) 
canonize certain generally accepted accounts of historical events like 
the Holocaust; (2) stifle legitimate discussion; and (3) spotlight and 
thereby aggrandize the purveyors of hate speech. 
                                                                                                                     
 91. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 1-52, 73-91 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett 
Pub. Co. 1982) (1859). See generally K.C. O’ROURKE, JOHN STUART MILL AND FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION: THE GENESIS OF A THEORY (2001).  
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B.   The Framework Decision and the Jurisprudential History of the 
European Union 
 The jurisprudential history of the European Union since the 
Holocaust has consistently favored the protection of individual and 
group dignity over the protection of individual speaking rights in 
situations where it is perceived that these two rights come into 
conflict.92 The Framework Decision takes this classically European 
position and mandates that speech be curtailed and even 
criminalized when it “grossly trivializes” the Holocaust or other 
international crimes against humanity.93 While the Framework 
Decision is certainly in line philosophically with the jurisprudential 
history of European society, the means by which it seeks to forward 
the European prodignity jurisprudence are flawed and should be 
changed or discarded. 
1.   The Concept of Dignity 
 The concept of dignity is not mentioned in the U.S. Constitution.94 
The Declaration of Independence seems to hint toward recognition of 
the concept of dignity with the phrase “[w]e hold these truths to be 
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed 
by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these 
are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”95 While this famous 
passage from the Declaration of Independence has no statutory force 
and does not specifically mention the word “dignity,” it comes close to 
circumscribing dignity as a concept. Specifically, the Declaration of 
Independence recognizes that there is a metaphysical aspect of hu-
man existence that is inherent in humanity itself. This inherent val-
ue appears changeless and timeless, shining forth from the individ-
ual regardless of circumstance. Dignity is the existential value of 
every individual. Dignity is in each and every case “mine,” because 
nothing and no one other than the individual himself may forsake 
and thereby diminish his own dignity. Dignity can be acknowledged 
or ignored but it cannot be bought or sold, given or taken. Dignity is 
an innate human quality that seems to spring either from God or 
from the fabric of being human itself.  
 These existential and metaphysical aspects of the concept of dig-
nity lead to several significant questions when viewed through the 
lens of jurisprudence: (1) is it possible for a statute to forward the 
legislative purpose of enhancing or preserving human dignity?; (2) is 
dignity strictly an attribute of the individual, or can the state or 
                                                                                                                     
 92. Van Blarcum, supra note 10, at 785-87. 
 93. Framework Decision, supra note 1, at 1. 
 94. See U.S. CONST. 
 95. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
58  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:41 
 
group possess dignity as well?; and (3) what role does the state play 
with regard to the question of dignity? The way that a society an-
swers these questions in large part determines which side of the hate 
speech dichotomy that society will inhabit.  
2.   Dignity and European Jurisprudence 
 Following the foregoing analysis, it is evident that the concept of 
human dignity plays a primary role in European jurisprudence on 
both a national and an international level. Based on this Article’s 
earlier observations of the way that laws regarding human dignity 
are enforced in Europe, it is reasonable to infer that European juris-
prudence generally takes the position that the power of the state may 
be legitimately used in an effort to promote or enhance the dignity of 
individuals and groups within society. Human dignity is of para-
mount importance, and state and international legislative bodies 
have a compelling interest in creating an environment in which dig-
nity may flourish. However, pursuant to the factored analysis, one 
must take issue with the means by which European jurisprudence, 
exemplified here by the Framework Decision, seeks to achieve the 
noble goal of preserving and enhancing human dignity within    
European society. 
 The reasoning behind the Framework Decision is that one way to 
preserve the dignity of the individual, minority, or minority group is 
to limit the speaking rights of other individuals or groups within so-
ciety. This flawed reasoning leads to a situation in which a society 
limits one fundamental right in the hope of enhancing another. How-
ever, freedom of speech, even highly unpopular and offensive speech, 
is not an obstacle to the state’s preservation of human dignity. In 
fact, the opposite is true. Freedom of speech for even the racist and/or 
morally bankrupt factions within a society enhances the dignity of 
all, and to sacrifice freedom of speech in an effort to preserve dignity 
can only serve to diminish the dignity of the masses.  
3.   Dignity and the Horizon of the Law 
 The reason that enhancing, rather than limiting, the speaking 
rights of the populace is the most conducive strategy that a sovereign 
may employ, when that sovereign’s purpose is to protect and enhance 
dignity, is that dignity is an innate quality of the individual that 
arises from within. Dignity occupies an internal realm deep within 
human consciousness and is largely unaffected by circumstances ex-
ternal to the ego. 
 A hypothetical example to illustrate this concept begins with an 
individual sitting on a park bench. An interloper approaches that 
same individual and begins shouting highly offensive insults at him. 
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Has the individual’s dignity been diminished by the insult? Of course 
not; the dignity of the individual arises from within. The hypothetical 
individual may be angry or offended, but his dignity is in no way di-
minished by the actions of the interloper. The interloper’s personal 
dignity may have been diminished by his offensive actions, and the 
individual may choose to return the insults of the interloper and the-
reby risk compromising his own dignity, but in each of these exam-
ples the dignity of the persons (both the individual and the inter-
loper) is threatened not by external causes, but by the ego’s             
internal choices. 
 Similarly, how can we expect a mere statute, like the Framework 
Decision, to penetrate to such depths of the human psyche as to be 
able to allocate something like dignity? We cannot, neither by limit-
ing speaking rights nor any other legislative strategy. The Frame-
work Decision is a legislative example of cutting off one’s nose to 
spite one’s face. By discarding speaking rights in an attempt to en-
hance individual dignity, the Framework Decision will succeed only 
in diminishing legitimate speech and thereby threaten the dignity of 
the governed. 
 Society can develop mechanisms other than the law to address of-
fensive and hurtful speech, mechanisms which can be more effective 
than criminalizing speech. African Americans have endured the 
worst racial discrimination in the United States, first through more 
than two hundred years of enslavement and then another hundred 
years of institutionalized oppression. All racist speech is offensive 
and hurtful, but particularly to a racial group like the African Ameri-
cans, which has endured so much discrimination in the United 
States. However, today, racist speech in the United States is often 
punished in the workplace not because it is illegal but because the 
society at large has developed a norm which does not tolerate such 
speech in many, if not most, places of employment. Although there 
are few statistics in this area, many individuals in the private sector 
have lost their jobs due to their racist comments, especially when 
those comments were made in public.96 Arguably, such nonlegal me-
thods freely chosen by an employer are more powerful than decisions 
coerced by the law because they respect the individual’s right and 
ability to decide. 
 An example of this societal norm against racist expression that 
has developed in American society in absence of legislation occurred 
when Trent Lott was forced to resign his position as Senate Majority 
Leader because he expressed support for Senator Strom Thurmond’s 
                                                                                                                     
 96. E.g., Don Imus Fired by CBS Radio for Racist Comments, One Day After MSNBC 
Drops Show, FOXNEWS.COM, Apr. 13, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/ 
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1948 “Dixecrat” segregationist campaign for President.97 Speaking at 
Senator Thurmond’s 100th birthday party, Senator Lott said, “I want 
to say this about my state. When Strom Thurmond ran for president, 
we voted for him. We’re proud of it. And if the rest of the country had 
followed our lead, we wouldn’t have had all these problems over all 
these years either.”98 Senator Lott was immediately met with harsh 
criticism from both sides of the political aisle after making this public 
statement.99 Senator Lott made multiple public apologies for these 
words, but the damage was already done.100 Fifteen days after mak-
ing this statement, Senator Lott resigned from his leadership posi-
tion in the Senate.101 Senator Lott was forced to resign, not by power 
of law, but by operation of a societal norm that developed organically 
within American society in the absence of legislation. 
 The societal norm against racist expression in the United States is 
not limited to the sphere of politics. In April 2007, CBS radio fired 
long-time talk-radio personality Don Imus for referring to African-
American members of the Rutgers University women’s basketball 
team as “nappy-headed hos [sic].”102 The MSNBC cable news network 
also dropped a TV simulcast of the Imus show that it had televised 
for more than ten years.103 Thus, even in the private sphere, the so-
cietal norm against racist speech in the United States shows its pow-
er. This nonlegislative deterrent to hateful and racist speech exem-
plifies the possibility of society enhancing the dignity of the individ-
ual by operation of the moral choices of individuals within society 
without legislative assistance. 
 To the extent that the reasoning underlying the Framework Deci-
sion is to protect persons from the threat of violence or to address a 
recent historical wrong in the country, the reasoning is well-
grounded. However, to the extent that the reasoning is based on gov-
ernment allocation of human dignity, it is flawed. Positive law cannot 
protect or enhance the dignity of the individual or group by identify-
ing and then proactively legislating against expression of undesirable 
trains of thought within the collective consciousness of a society. On-
ly when the law recedes and allows the greatest possible freedom to 
speak and be spoken to, can a positive impact on the dignity of a peo-
ple be perceived.  
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2008]   HOLOCAUST DENIAL AND THE CONCEPT OF DIGNITY 61 
 
 It is important to note here that I am not arguing that the gov-
ernment should not treat people with dignity. Nothing could be fur-
ther from the case. All persons, including governments, should strive 
at all times to treat citizens and noncitizens with dignity. The point 
is simply that positive law can not enhance the dignity of the gov-
erned. This is especially true where the means employed toward the 
goal of the improvement of dignity is the limitation of the fundamen-
tal right to speak. 
4.   Dignity and Free Speech 
 Half of the thesis to this Section of the Article is proven once we 
have established that dignity can be neither allocated by statute nor 
enhanced by the limitation of speaking rights. This point (if it has 
been established) leads to the question that frames the second half of 
this analysis: Does broadly protecting the speaking rights of even the 
most offensive, hateful, and racist factions of society actually en-
hance the dignity of the individual or group within society? This Ar-
ticle takes the position that the dignity of individuals and groups 
within society may be enhanced when the law draws back and allows 
greater freedom of speech. 
 It is appropriate from the outset of this portion of the analysis to 
address the inevitable dissenters who will criticize this analysis for 
arguing out of both sides of the mouth. Those dissenters will surely 
protest that the preceding Section of this analysis posited that dig-
nity is beyond the reach of the law, and now the analysis has pro-
ceeded to turn around and argue that dignity can be enhanced by the 
operation of law. Nothing could be further from the case. Rather, this 
Article takes the following position: most positive law approaches to 
the protection or enhancement of dignity are inherently flawed for 
the reasons discussed above; however, when the law recedes and de-
clines to legislate in certain areas like speech restriction, what is left 
is an organic open space within which individuals and factions 
within society can make moral choices which may enhance their own 
personal and/or group dignity.  
 The firmament upon which this portion of the argument is based 
is again the uniquely internal nature of dignity itself. The preceding 
argument attempted to establish that external conditions have little 
or no effect on the dignity of the individual or group. The corollary to 
this position is that individuals or groups may forsake or enhance 
their own dignity through their individual choices and actions. 
 When a society regulates speech based on content, it limits the 
space in which the individual may make the moral choices necessary 
to enhance his or her personal dignity. When a society declines to re-
gulate speech, it leaves the individual free to think and choose in a 
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manner which may enhance his or her personal dignity. The better 
way for a state or an international body to forward the legislative 
purpose of enhancing and/or promoting the dignity of the individual 
and the group within society is to leave that space open and allow the 
individual or group to find its own way to dignity through decisions 
that arise from an environment of unbounded speech and expression. 
 This is not an argument against dignity as a jurisprudential con-
cept. The author holds the utmost respect for the concept of dignity 
and feels that nation states and international bodies are justified in 
taking actions that promote dignity’s cause. This is not an argument 
against dignity as a legitimate legislative end. This argument re-
serves its criticism for the means by which the Framework Decision 
attempts to achieve the legitimate legislative goal of protecting the 
dignity of the individual. 
 When a society resorts to the coercion of law to hear only the 
viewpoints it finds acceptable, it employs tools of repression and in-
tolerance to supposedly enhance human dignity.104 Words sometimes 
offend and wound a listener and usually the state can do little to 
prevent these psychic injuries. However, the best way to promote a 
civil discourse and minimize such injuries is not to shut one side 
down, but to invite the sides to a deeper discussion. The challenge of 
legislators is to find nonrepressive ways to promote human dignity. 
 The curtailment of free speech in the manner mandated by the 
framework is anathema to dignity, both as an abstract concept and 
as a definite legislative goal. More freedom of speech, more debate, 
more dialectic—this is the path to enhance the dignity of the gov-
erned because it values each individual, including the outliers with 
opinions that the majority finds deeply offensive.  
 Are the proponents of the Framework Decision afraid that the 
ideas that they condemn will prevail in an open and honest societal 
debate? Do the proponents of the Framework Decision distrust the 
intelligence of the governed to the extent that they feel that certain 
historical opinions must be mandated by fiat? Those questions, which 
can only be reasonably answered in the affirmative, underline the 
point of this argument. The means that the Framework Decision em-
ploys in its quest for dignity are offensive to the dignity of                 
the individual. 
 Banning hateful speech is a superficial attempt to address the 
deeper problem of respecting one’s own and another’s human dignity. 
                                                                                                                     
 104. See R. George Wright, Consenting Adults: The Problem of Enhancing Human Dig-
nity Non-Coercively, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1397, 1399 (1995) (examining “the relationship be-
tween consent and human dignity and inquir[ing] into noncoercive devices, both govern-
mental and social, for encouraging and safeguarding the dignity of individuals without un-
dermining their autonomy”). 
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If a goal is to address the deeper problems of racism and ethnic and 
religious prejudice, more speech rather than less speech is needed. 
Such conversation is less likely to begin, let alone reach the deeper 
concerns, if one side’s expression is proscribed by criminal law. Using 
the coercive power of the state to ban the speech of a purveyor of hate 
not only eliminates the conversation, but reduces the space and op-
portunity for that person to be transformed.  
 And so it seems that the foregoing analysis has turned the Euro-
pean jurisprudential history of human dignity and the approach to 
preservation of dignity through content-based regulation of speech on 
its head. The Framework Decision certainly arises and follows a pre-
valent avenue of thought that runs throughout the recent history of 
European jurisprudence—the idea that human dignity is inviolate 
and is best preserved by government control of speech. However, 
based on the foregoing analyses, it is clear that the means by which 
the Framework Decision seeks to forward its prodignity agenda are 
flawed and the statute is bound to fail. The Framework Decision’s 
positivistic approach to the issues of the preservation of dignity 
through speech regulation can only lead to bureaucracy, inconsistent 
application, oppression, and the creation of an environment where 
dignity can not thrive. 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
 The main purpose of this Article has been to examine the Frame-
work Decision under the two categories of the factored approach to 
hate speech regulation: (1) whether the law is enacted by a society 
that has a recent history of racial, religious, or ethnic strife that is 
sufficiently severe to justify the curtailment of its citizens’ funda-
mental right to free speech in order to address the historical wrong; 
and (2) whether the jurisprudential history of the state, or states if it 
is an international treaty, is amenable to content-based speech re-
strictions within its understanding of freedom of expression. That 
analysis has lead to the following general conclusions: (1) the 
Framework Decision certainly addresses a horrific historical wrong 
(i.e., the Holocaust), but it is overly broad in scope because it man-
dates that many nations who bear no responsibility (some of which 
were not even in existence at the time) for the Holocaust criminalize 
speech acts that do not follow the generally accepted historical ac-
count of that crime; and (2) the Framework Decision certainly falls in 
line with the European jurisprudential express recognition of the 
primacy and necessity of the preservation of human dignity, but the 
means it uses to advance dignity’s cause are flawed and likely to fail.  
 In conclusion, this Article offers a few final observations regarding 
the controversies surrounding the Holocaust and the Holocaust de-
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nial/revision movements. There seems to be a certain fundamental 
futility underlying the attempts of the various institutions cited in 
this Article to establish a historical record by fiat. In criminalizing 
certain trends of critical analysis of an event like the Holocaust, the 
state and international institutions discussed herein undermine the 
strength of the overwhelming evidence for the historical Holocaust. 
 When a state criminalizes a certain account of a historical event, 
it takes history out of the realm of science and elevates it to the sta-
tus of scripture. This act of criminalization undermines the strength 
of the historical record because it suggests that the power structures 
that are implementing the legislation are afraid that the undesirable 
positions and arguments that they are seeking to suppress may de-
velop a legitimacy they cannot control. Supporters of this legislation 
either do not trust the people or do not trust the truth. 
 Ironically, laws prohibiting the denial of the Holocaust empower 
the Holocaust denial movement. Holocaust deniers gain political 
strength when they point to these laws and say to their followers, 
“You see . . . our ideas are so powerful, they are afraid to even allow 
us to discuss them, let alone debate us!” The better approach is to 
confront the absurd and racist claims of the Holocaust deniers with 
facts drawn from the overwhelming historical record. This approach 
allows the ideas of the Holocaust denial movement to be discredited, 
and that is achieved without resort to laws and trials that merely 
grant the movement a public forum from which to espouse their 
views and message of persecution and hatred. To protect the cause of 
dignity, this confrontation must take place in a free and open envi-
ronment where the debaters are free to express their true ideas 
without fear of governmental retribution. 
 How will the governed ever be able to trust a historical record that 
is established and enforced by the police power of the state? Once a 
precedent for enforcing a historical record with police power is estab-
lished, how can it be controlled and who will have the power to con-
trol it? Even when altruistically motivated, legislators should not be-
stow on government the power of establishing and enforcing the ex-
pression of orthodox views, whether it involves historical, scientific, 
or religious “truth.”  
 There is no need for the legislators of the European Union to fear 
the truth. If the evidence of the facticity of the generally accepted ac-
counts of the Holocaust is sufficient to form the historical record (as I 
believe it is), then the legislative bodies discussed herein have no 
need to fear the speech and pseudoscience of the Holocaust den-
iers/revisionists. If the evidence of the facticity of the generally ac-
cepted accounts of the Holocaust is not sufficient to form a complete 
historical record or if research is needed to further develop the re-
cord, then a robust debate about what really happened is warranted. 
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Either way, legislation like the Framework Decision impedes the 
process by which history is recorded by a society and undermines the 
strength of the evidence in the historical record. Truth needs no law 
to mandate its acceptance, and the truth of the horrific crimes of the 
Holocaust is clear to anyone who takes the time to examine the his-
torical record.  
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